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LEGAL R!GHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Neil MacCormick. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 1982. Pp. x, 272. $29.95. 
Social democracy, as understood and defended by Professor Neil 
MacCormick, 1 represents a middle ground between the political 
philosophies of classical Liberal individualism and Marxist social-
ism. Classical Liberalism protects abstract legal liberty, but permits 
economic disparities among individuals which may undercut con-
crete freedom of choice. Marxist socialism addresses the economic 
realities of industrial society, but often at the expense of individual 
liberty. Social democracy attempts a synthesis. It is a theory of 
political organization in which the state provides individuals with 
maximum equal liberty subject to the constraint of economic fairness 
embodied in a program of distributive justice. 
Legal Right and Social Democracy is a revised collection of previ-
ously published essays. MacCormick deals with broad issues such as 
"Law and Economics," "Civil Liberties and the Law'' and "Law, 
Obligation and Consent." He also treats the nature of rights and 
duties on the narrower, individual level of contract and tort in essays 
such as "Voluntary Obligations" and "The Obligation of Repara-
tion.'' The essays draw on and critique the works of philosophers 
past and present. MacCormick discusses the theories of Lord Stair, 
John Locke and Adam Smith. He attempts to define his ideas on 
rights and political obligation in relation to those of John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin.2 
This diversity of subject matter makes it difficult to follow, if not 
to find, MacCormick's thesis. His arguments do not clearly build on 
each other from chapter to chapter. This can be disconcerting and 
confusing to readers without a solid background in political theory. 
The essays do, however, contain related themes. What MacCormick 
wishes to emphasize is that human beings have rights and that these 
rights are best satisfied under societal conditions of maximum equal 
liberty and economic fairness. 
Assuming MacCormick is correct in asserting that social democ-
racy is responsive to individual rights of liberty and material equal-
ity, he still must perform the primary and more difficult task of· 
establishing why human beings have a moral claim to these rights. 
1. Neil MacCormick is Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Na-
tions at the University of Edinburgh. 
2. MacCormick devotes an entire chapter to a critique of John Rawls' A THEORY OF Jus-
TICE (1971), and another chapter to an analysis of Ronald Dworkin's TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977). 
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For example, MacCormick asserts a "debt of justice" owed by the 
rich to the poor (p. 15), although it is far from clear how this debt 
arises. 
MacCormick does not rely on a theory of natural rights. Natural 
rights, he argues, make "unsustainable ontological assumptions 
about the existence of objective and rationally discoverable princi-
ples of right" (p. 54). MacCormick also rejects John Rawls' contrac-
tual basis for rights although MacCormick's conception of social 
democracy is obviously akin to Rawls' "two principles of justice."3 
MacCormick develops a convincing critique of Rawls' contract 
approach. He points out that the hypothetical conditions of fairness 
imposed on society members constrain their deliberations in a way 
that is favorable to the adoption of Rawls' principles of justice. 
MacCormick further doubts the propriety of deriving principles of 
justice from hypothetical contractual situations. Instead, he believes 
that principles of justice should be assessed by reference to the prac-
tical consequences of their adoption in much the same way a judge 
might decide a case on the basis of policy implications. 
This hardly provides a moral basis for social democratic princi-
ples such as the redistribution of wealth. The strength of Rawls' 
work is that it attempts to provide moral justification for the princi-
ples of justice. MacCormick finds this justification lacking, but does 
not improve on or supplant it. It may appear socially desirable (to 
some) to redistribute wealth, but MacCormick must make redistribu-
tion take the form of a m9ral imperative. 
MacCormick fares better in providing moral and legal bases for 
rights in his discussion of interpersonal relationships on the individ-
ual, rather than societal, level. He argues that voluntary or contrac-
tual obligations arise independently of legal rules. For 
MacCormick, the rules of contract are most aptly described as a for-
mal response to the moral implications of promising and inducing 
reliance on the part of the promisee. In tort, moral and legal obliga-
tions of reparation to injured parties do not depend on the state of 
mind of the person committing the injury, but on the right of the 
injured party to be secure in his or her person and possessions. 
These moral and legal rights in contract and tort are well recog-
nized. But, if MacCormick's discussion does not break new ground, 
it does nicely work through some of the theoretical underpinnings of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. However, MacCormick gets into 
trouble when he attempts to extend the obligation of reparation to 
illustrate how it comports with his ideal of distributive justice. 
3. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). Rawls believes that people under hypo-
thetical conditions of fairness would choose principles of maximum equal liberty and distribu-
tive justice to govern their political society. Because these principles are chosen under 
conditions of fairness they possess a moral claim to obedience. 
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MacCormick would impose an obligation on society to provide 
for individuals injured through no one's fault. But how does this 
obligation follow from the obligation of reparation? The obligation 
of reparation is triggered by an individual's breach of the duty of 
care - the correlative of the injured party's right to personal 
security. In the case of a person crippled by disease, for example, no 
duty has been violated. There is no right of reparation unless one 
assumes that society owes the individual a "debt of justice." But this 
is exactly what MacCormick has failed to establish. 
In the end, MacCormick must rely on his own theories of prop-
erty rights and human nature to justify the adoption of social demo-
cratic principles. These theories, while attractive, are ultimately 
contestable and will not persuade those who do not accept Mac-
Cormick's personal moral views. 
MacCormick adopts the Kantian position that human beings 
must be respected as ends in themselves. It is this moral view that 
informs his advocacy of social democracy. The conditions of respect 
for human beings must include the liberty to pursue one's own con-
ception of the good and a claim to a fair share of material wealth. 
According to MacCormick, to be human is to be free to define life 
plans for oneself and to enjoy a degree of material well-being to, at 
least, entertain such plans. These rights are intrinsic to our moral 
status as human beings and command the respect of the state. In this 
sense, the state owes a "debt of justice" to its citizens. 
MacCormick's argument is subject to internal and external at-
tack. First, one may believe that human beings have a right to lib-
erty and economic fair shares and still wish to dispute that it is the 
duty of the state, as opposed to private organizations, to secure these 
rights. For example, MacCormick believes that children have a right 
to the best possible education; however, he admits that it is unclear 
who - parents, church, local authority, or central government -
owes the duty of providing that education (p. 163). 
More fundamentally, the moral view that human beings should 
be treated as ends is open to question. One may adhere to a system 
of utilitarian ethics in which the ultimate good is to maximize the 
total aggregate of happiness in society. Instead of believing that 
each individual should be accorded maximum equal liberty and eco-
nomic fair shares, utilitarians would be morally committed to un-
equal liberty and large disparities in wealth if it could be shown that 
such a state of affairs would maximize total happiness. 
MacCormick recognizes that he cannot convince everyone of his 
position. He states that, "[o]ne cannot believe in the category 'moral 
rights' unless one· accepts in some form the principle that sentient 
beings ought to be respected as ends in themselves" (p. 161). That 
principle, part of the Kantian and Millian tradition, will appeal to 
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many with whom it is productive to enter into moral discourse. Le-
gal Right and Social .Democracy provides a forum for this discourse. 
Unfortunately, the disjointed nature of this collection of essays is 
such that clearer resolution of questions of right and social democ-
racy will have to await a more sustained and focused work. 
